The Future Battlefield is Melting: An Argument for Why the U.S. Must Adopt a More Proactive Arctic Strategy
A Royal Netherlands Navy Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel is anchored as U.S. Marines prepare to disembark the HNLMS Rotterdam for an amphibious beach landing during Exercise Cold Response 2022, Norway, March 21, 2022. Photo: U.S. Marine Corps
The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025
The Arctic is insufficiently prioritized amidst the United States’ competing global interests. The future battlefield is melting and demands US attention, as a partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China fuels strategic competition in the Arctic. Thus, the United States must adopt a proactive Arctic strategy, working with its NATO Allies to ensure that the Arctic remains stable and free from conflict. The US’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines that the United States “seeks a stable Arctic region characterized by adherence to internationally agreed upon rules and norms.”1)U.S. Department of Defense (2022) 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States (2022). https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF. Accessed on 6 September 2024 To achieve a secure Arctic, the 2024 Arctic Strategy, produced by the U.S. Department of Defense, follows a “monitor-and-respond” approach. However, this reactive strategy is inadequate.2)U.S. Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Arctic Strategy. U.S. Department of Defense (2024) Arctic Strategy. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2024
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine provides evidence that Moscow will not adhere to the current global order and will continue to challenge Western international norms wherever possible, including in the Arctic. NATO’s growing appeal among European states suggests that NATO may also be called upon to guarantee the future of Arctic stability. Instead of dividing Europe, isolating Ukraine, and expanding its influence, Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a closer alliance between the United States and its Arctic NATO allies. Moreover, NATO, with the accession of Finland and Sweden, has expanded,, and now seven out of the eight Arctic nations are NATO members. The alliance offers an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its position in the Arctic region while not having to go it alone.
The current US Arctic Strategy insufficiently counters Russian and Chinese strategic Arctic ambitions, though the makings of a more effective Arctic Strategy already exist in the pages of the 2024 Arctic Strategy. Washington must build on this foundation, shifting its mindset towards the Arctic. A proactive Arctic Strategy is needed, in which the United States and its NATO partners are not afraid to define the rules and laws governing the north. Critics of this approach will claim that taking a more assertive position in the Arctic will further antagonize Russia and divert important resources from the Indo-Pacific region and China. This is simply not the case. Russia and China have already taken steps to claim and militarize the Arctic. By acting now, the US and its NATO allies will be better positioned to counter the threat posed by Russia and China in the Arctic and beyond.
Why the Next War Will Be Won or Lost in the Arctic
Climate change has accelerated strategic competition in the region among both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, such as China. Melting sea ice from rising global temperatures has created new military and economic opportunities in the region. Since 1979, the Arctic has warmed four times faster than the rest of the world, according to an August 2022 scientific study published in Nature.3)Rantanen, M (2022) The Arctic Has Warmed Nearly Four Times Faster than the Globe since 1979. Communications Earth & Environment 3(1): 1-10. As ice rapidly melts in the Arctic, increased access to critical rare earth elements, such as platinum, copper, lithium, cobalt, and nickel emerge. Moreover, melting ice is opening more easily traversed Arctic waters, which has led to a surge of both military and commercial ship activity in the region. These two developments have increased the potential for conflict in the Arctic.
Any nation that can effectively mine, process, and refine the materials will have a strategic advantage. These minerals are required for developing technologies ranging from renewable energy systems to electronics used for national defense. According to the World Bank, the demand to produce minerals, many of which are found in the Arctic, could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean energy technologies.4)World Bank Group (2020) Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smart-mining-minerals-for-climate-action. Accessed on 24 September 2024 China already dominates the global supply chain for critical materials. The United States depends on these materials for its economic competitiveness and national defense.5)Watson B (2023) Critical Minerals in the Arctic: Forging the Path Forward. Wilson Center, 10 July, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/critical-minerals-arctic-forging-path-forward. Accessed on 24 September 2024
As ice melts, new routes are emerging that are more navigable. This has resulted in more ship activity in the region. For instance, the Arctic Council Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment reports that there has been a 37 percent increase in ship numbers and distance sailed in the Arctic over the past ten years.6)The Arctic Council (2024) Arctic shipping update: 37% increase in ships in the Arctic over 10 years. The Arctic Council 31 January, https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/. Accessed on 18 August 2024 While much of this activity is commercial, Russia and China have also taken advantage of the new sea routes to project their naval power. They have carried out numerous regional deployments and patrols, demonstrating their ability to execute military operations in the austere Arctic climate.7)Uryupova E (2023) Global interest in the Arctic region: Naval operations impacting scientific-commercial activities. Polar Record, 59(e8): 2-3. The expanded presence of Russian and Chinese ships in the region poses a growing threat to NATO member states. In October 2023, Finnish investigators suspected the Chinese vessel NewNew Polar Bear of dragging its anchor over the seabed and severing three Baltic telecom cables and one pipeline. While the international community has not assigned blame wholly to China, China later admitted to accidentally destroying an important gas pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea in 2024. These examples suggest that incidents of this nature could become more likely as military activity increases in the region.8)Trevelyan M (2023) Russia Firm Says Baltic Telecoms Cable Was Severed as Chinese Ship Passed Over. Reuters, 7 November, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-telecoms-cable-damaged-last-month-just-before-nearby-baltic-gas-2023-11-07/. Accessed on 20 September 2024; Pollard J (2024) China Says HK Ship Destroyed Baltic Gas Pipeline by Accident. Asia Financial, 12 August, https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-says-hk-ship-destroyed-baltic-gas-pipeline-by-accident. Accessed on 20 September 2024
Competition in the Arctic Is Heating Up: Russian and Chinese Ambitions
The growing partnership between Russia and China provides early warning signs that the region could become a site of future conflict. In 2021 Russia and China renewed their 20-year-old Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a move described as “an act of friendship against America.”9)Legarda H (2021) From Marriage of Convenience to Strategic Partnership: China-Russia Relations and the Fight for Global Influence. Merics, 24 August, https://merics.org/en/comment/marriage-convenience-strategic-partnership-china-russia-relations-and-fight-global. Accessed on 20 August 2024 Moreover, both Russia and China have deep historic and economic ties to the Arctic. NATO’s expansion to include Finland and Sweden have increased tensions in the region, while both Russia and China have expressed their disapproval of NATO’s increasing presence in the Arctic.10)Rehman M (2022) Changing Contours of Arctic Politics and the Prospects for Cooperation between Russia and China. The Arctic Institute, 23 August, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/changing-contours-arctic-politics-prospects-cooperation-russia-china/. Accessed on 12 September 2024 However, despite feeling antagonized by NATO’s actions, Moscow and Beijing may not have the economic and military capacities to reshape the current international rules-based order in the Arctic in the near term.
Despite being the only non-NATO member in the Arctic, Russia controls over 53 percent of the Arctic coastline, making it a decisive player in the future of the region.11)Arctic Council (2023) The Russian Federation. https://arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/. Accessed on 29 September 2024. Yet, Russia’s Arctic ambitions are not new. Russia’s connection with the Arctic can be traced back to the sixteenth century, beginning with its conquest of Siberia, which was part of a larger initiative to search for resources and trade routes.12)Rumer E, et al (2021) Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 29 March, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/russia-in-the-arctica-critical-examination?lang=en. Accessed on 29 September 2024 As the nation matured, its Arctic ambitions did as well. During the Cold War, the Soviets established both a nuclear and naval presence on the Kola Peninsula to project power against the U.S. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the de jure inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, did not abandon its desire to be an Arctic power.
As the Russian economy recovered in the early 2000s under Vladimir Putin, Russia began posturing for Arctic supremacy, reopening multiple Soviet-era military bases, modernizing its navy, and developing new hypersonic missiles designed to evade U.S. sensors and defenses.13)Gronholt-Pedersen, et al (2022) Dark Arctic: NATO Allies Wake Up to Russian Supremacy in the Region. Reuters,16 November, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/. Accessed on 21 September 2024 Moreover, in August 2022, Moscow announced that it would refocus its military power on the Arctic and Nordic region.14)Cunningham A (2024) Shifting Ice: How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Changed Arctic Circle Governance and the Arctic Council’s Path Forward. The Arctic Institute, 14 May, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/shifting-ice-russian-invasion-ukraine-arctic-circle-governance-arctic-councils-path-forward/. Accessed on 2 October 2024 According to Colin Wall, a research associate at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, “The military balance in the Arctic is heavily weighted towards Russia.” Furthermore, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Reuters cite that Russia’s bases inside the Arctic Circle outnumber NATO’s by roughly a third.15)Gronholt-Pedersen, et al (2022) Dark Arctic: NATO Allies Wake Up to Russian Supremacy in the Region. Reuters,16 November, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/. Accessed on 21 September 2024 Russia’s remilitarization of the Arctic and its revitalized strategic partnership with China, provides both countries with the means to challenge the current Western rules-based international order.
Although China’s Arctic history does not mirror Russia’s centuries-old presence in the north, Beijing’s desire for Arctic supremacy has rapidly evolved over the past century. China’s involvement in the Arctic began in 1925 with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty, providing a legal basis for China to conduct non-military activity, such as scientific exploration, resource extraction, and fishing in the Arctic.16)Kopra S (2020) China and Its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020. The Arctic Institute, 17 March, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-trajectories-the-arctic-institute-china-series-2020/. Accessed on 1 October 2024 However, China’s rationale to operate in the region extends beyond scientific exploration.
In 2018 China released its first Arctic White Paper, which asserts that it is a “Near-Arctic State.”17)People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2018) People’s Republic of China (PRC), China’s Arctic Policy. 26 Jan, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 12 September 2024 China employs a dual narrative to explain its aims in the Arctic. Externally, Beijing appeals to foreign audiences by advocating for the safeguarding of international interests and promoting sustainable Arctic development. However, this is juxtaposed against the narrative it promotes for domestic audiences, which emphasizes competition for resources and China’s desire to become a “polar great power.”18)Kopra S (2020) China and Its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020. The Arctic Institute, 17 March, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-trajectories-the-arctic-institute-china-series-2020/. Accessed on 1 October 2024 The Svalbard Treaty has currently enabled China to shroud its military activity and influence in the Arctic as scientific exploration and global cooperation. But it is becoming clear from its growing partnership with Russia and increasingly aggressive military action in the Arctic that China’s intentions to reshape the international system extend well beyond the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and NATO would be wise to recognize China’s aims in the Arctic.
The historic ties of Russia and China and their Arctic ambitions reveal that the Arctic is likely to be an arena for future strategic competition. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has temporarily bolstered the West’s position in the Arctic, as previously neutral Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Finland’s accession into NATO not only increased the NATO-Russia land border by over 650 percent and moved the defense alliance a mere 250 miles from St. Petersburg, but it also contributed to creating a divided Arctic, where nearly half belongs to NATO while the remaining half is Russian territory.
Threatened by the growing alliance, in June 2022, Putin warned that if U.S.-NATO military contingents or military infrastructure appears in either Sweden or Finland, Russia will respond “symmetrically” by deploying nuclear weapons to the Baltic Sea region to restore military balance and strengthen its defenses.19)Roth A (2022) Putin Issues Fresh Warning to Finland and Sweden on Installing Nato Infrastructure. The Guardian,29 June, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/29/russia-condemns-nato-invitation-finland-sweden. Accessed on 26 March 2023 In February 2023, Putin made good on this threat and deployed Russian ships armed with tactical nuclear weapons to the Baltic Sea. According to Norway, this was the first time in 30 years that this has happened.20)Dasgutpa S (2023) Russia Deploys Ships with Nuclear Weapons for First Time in 30 Years, Says Norway. The Independent, 15 February, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-norway-tactical-nuclear-weapons-b2282558.html. Accessed on 30 March 2023 Then in June 2024, Moscow began to train soldiers and sailors to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Leningrad, a military district bordering NATO members Norway, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.21)Faulconbridge G (2024) Russia Broadens Tactical Nuclear Weapons Drills. Reuters, 12 June, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-non-strategic-nuclear-drills-involve-iskander-missiles-2024-06-12/. Accessed on 1 September 2024 As evidenced by these actions, while Putin is not afraid to rattle the nuclear saber, it is not likely that Russia has the military or economic capacity to engage in a direct conventional conflict with NATO.
NATO leaders recognize that there is a finite window of time to prepare for conflict against Russia. In 2024 the head of the Norwegian armed forces warned that NATO countries only have two to three years to prepare for a Russian attack. Norwegian General Eirik Kristoffersen claims that Moscow is building up its military stockpile faster than previously predicted, while Western nations have depleted their own weapons by supplying them to Ukraine.22)Reyes R (2024) Norway Military Chief Warns Europe Has “two, maybe 3 years” to Prepare for War with Russia. NyPost, 23 January, https://nypost.com/2024/01/23/news/norway-military-chief-warns-europe-has-two-maybe-3-years-to-prepare-for-war-with-russia/. Accessed on 2 October 2024 Several other European leaders have echoed these concerns, citing that they have between three and eight years to prepare for a Russian attack against NATO.23)Monaghan S et al. (2024) Is NATO Ready for War? 11 June, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-ready-war. Accessed on 2 October 2024 Despite Russia’s aggressive rhetoric, Moscow understands that because of its war against Ukraine it likely will not have the capability to attack NATO in the near future. For instance, Russia removed nearly all its ground forces from the Finnish border to Ukraine in June 2024.24)Fornusek M (2024) Russia Has Moved Almost All Ground Forces From Finland’s Vicinity to Ukraine, Media Report. The Kyiv Independent, 19 June, https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report/. Accessed on 11 August 2024 Russia’s timeframe to launch a successful attack is dependent not only on its economy but also on its partnership with the PRC.
Why the U.S. Needs its Arctic NATO Allies
The United States has already begun to take a more active approach in the Arctic; however, the region must become an even greater priority. Following Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO, the alliance’s center of gravity, its primary source of strength and stability, shifted North and closer to the Russian border. This is not the first instance of NATO borders moving closer to Russia. In 2007, Putin provided a final “friendly” warning that NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”25)Carpenter T (2022) Many Predicted Nato Expansion Would Lead to War. Those Warnings Were Ignored. The Guardian, 28 February, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine. Accessed 3 October 2024; JRL Russia (2007) Transcript: 2007 Putin Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Johnson’s Russia List, 27 March, https://russialist.org/transcript-putin-speech-and-the-following-discussion-at-the-munich-conference-on-security-policy/. Accessed on 3 October 2024 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) reaffirms its commitment to NATO, underscoring the importance of collective defense aimed at deterring Russian aggression. Despite this stated commitment, the NDS does not directly address how it will respond in the event that Russia attacks a NATO member state, forcing the alliance to respond. While the current NDS and Arctic Strategy offer assurances of protection to the U.S. homeland, a proactive Arctic posture will mitigate future conflict in the region.
The United States already views itself as a leader in the European Arctic. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to uphold international law, close gaps in governance, and protect sovereign rights in the European Arctic.26)The White House (2022) U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. Accessed on 3 October 2024 The United States was integral in developing multiple intergovernmental institutions, including the Arctic Council in 1991.27)The Arctic Council (2023) The Arctic Council. Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/. Accessed on 1 Oct. 2024 With growing competition in the European Arctic, the United States should continue to use its great power status to insert itself as a lead actor in the region through the establishment of a proactive Arctic Strategy coupled with enhanced economic and military cooperation with its Nordic NATO Allies. Today, while Russia is engrossed in its war against Ukraine, the United States and its allies have the opportunity to remain one step ahead.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States has begun to increase its presence in the European High North. Underscoring the importance of collective defense, the United States has entered into several new bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA) with Nordic nations. In 2022, the United States signed a DCA with Norway, which acknowledges that the presence of U.S. forces in Norway contributes to strengthening the security and stability of the region and permit American forces unimpeded access to four Norwegian military bases.28)U.S. Department of State (2021) Agreement Between the United States of America and Norway. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 22-617.; Edvardsen, A (2023) The Nordic Region Strengthens Double-Edged Defense Cooperation With the U.S.. High North News, 17 February, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/nordic-region-strengthens-double-edged-defense-cooperation-us. Accessed on 25 September 2024 Since the establishment of the defense agreement, Norway and the United States added an amendment, allowing U.S. forces and NATO allies to access eight additional facilities in Norway for military purposes, emphasizing the growing security threat in the European Arctic.29)Ministry of Defense (2024) Norway and USA Agree on Additional Agreed Facilities and Areas under the SDCA. Forsvarsdepartnmentet, 2 February, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-and-usa-agree-on-additional-agreed-facilities-and-areas-under-the-sdca/id3023830/. Accessed on 25 September 2024 Following Norway’s lead, Denmark signed its DCA with the United States in 2023 followed by Finland and Sweden in 2024.30)Finland, U.S. Embassy (2023) The United States and Finland Signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on December 18, 2023. U.S. Embassy in Finland, 21 December, https://fi.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-finland-signed-a-defense-cooperation-agreement-on-december-18-2023/. Accessed on 5 May 2023; United States Department of State (2024) U.S. Security Cooperation with Denmark. United States Department of State, 8 April, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-denmark/. Accessed on 25 September 2024; Regringskansliet (2023) Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States. Regeringen och, 6 December, https://www.government.se/government-policy/military-defence/defence-cooperation-agreement-with-the-united-states/. Accessed on 25 September 2024 DCAs such as these offer increased and mutually beneficial opportunities for the United States and its Nordic NATO Allies to prepare for any future hostilities.
As part of the US’s proactive Arctic Strategy, Washington should prioritize economic investments in companies owned by NATO members. Through these investments, energy security within NATO can be improved, and the nations can decrease their dependence on rare earth materials from China. The United States has already taken initial steps to secure critical mineral and clean energy supply chains, but more can be done. In September 2024, the United States signed a Critical Minerals Agreement with Norway, demonstrating both countries’ commitment to working together to ensure energy security.31)U.S. Department of State (2024) Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide at the Signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation on High-Standard, Market-Oriented Trade of Critical Minerals. The United States Department of State, 30 September, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-norwegian-foreign-minister-espen-barth-eide-at-the-signing-of-a-memorandum-of-cooperation-on-high-standard-market-oriented-trade-of-critical-minerals/. Accessed on 4 October 2024 Another such opportunity for the U.S. to further support its Nordic Allies exists in Sweden. In 2024 the Swedish mining company LKAP discovered Europe’s largest deposit of rare earth elements in the northern city of Kiruna, Sweden. Norway and Sweden have already begun collaborating to increase energy security through the Norwegian company, REETec, which has developed technology to separate rare earth metals that competes with China’s production of these materials.32)Gunn H (2022) Norwegian-Swedish Cooperation on Rare Earth Metals: Marks the Beginning of Something New in Europe. High North News, 10 November, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/norwegian-swedish-cooperation-rare-earth-metals-marks-beginning-something-new-europe. Accessed on 24 September 2024 According to the CEO of LKAB, Jan Moström, this cooperation provides the foundation to develop a “strong and sustainable Nordic value chain for rare earth metals.”33)Gunn H (2022) Norwegian-Swedish Cooperation on Rare Earth Metals: Marks the Beginning of Something New in Europe. High North News, 10 November, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/norwegian-swedish-cooperation-rare-earth-metals-marks-beginning-something-new-europe. Accessed on 24 September 2024 A proactive U.S. Arctic Strategy that takes into consideration increased NATO energy security through Nordic investment further bolsters the United States’ ability to decrease dependence on China and should be pursued.
Increased cooperation between the United States and its Nordic NATO Allies provides an opportunity for the U.S. to couple a new proactive Arctic Strategy with tangible training goals for forces at the tactical and operational levels. For example, U.S. forces and their Norwegian counterparts have benefited from a mutually supportive military alliance for decades. During the Cold War, Norway was a critical U.S. ally for power projection, defense, and deterrence in the north. Its geostrategic location was optimal for protecting NATO’s northern flank from Soviet aggression so much so that the United States stockpiled weapons, vehicles, and ammunition in strategic locations across Norway.34)U.S. Department of State (2011) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Governing Prestoackage and Reinforcement of Norway. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/180656.pdf. Accessed on 24 September 2024 These stockpiles were crucial for increasing U.S. power projection and enhancing NATO’s operational responsiveness in the European arena. Additionally, Norway’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the adjacent Norwegian and Barents Seas allowed NATO to challenge the Soviets’ ability to deploy nuclear-powered submarines if the Cold War turned hot.
The U.S.–Norwegian Alliance has only grown since the end of the Cold War. In 2017, the United States Marine Corps began sending a battalion of Marines to Northern Norway as part of a rotational deployment. The United States Marine Corps continues to deploy thousands of forces to train alongside its Norwegian Allies annually. Moreover, in 2018, Norway hosted Exercise Trident Juncture, a NATO-led military exercise based on a fictitious Article 5 collective defense scenario. It was the largest exercise of its kind in Norway since the 1980s, and 31 nations participated.35)Masters J (2018) NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercises: What to Know. Council on Foreign Relations, 23 October, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/natos-trident-juncture-exercises-what-know. Accessed on 1 October 2024 Large-scale multinational exercises of this kind increase force proficiency operating in Arctic environments and enhance NATO member states’ ability to work with each other in wartime.
The United States has been increasing its ability to work with its Swedish and Finnish counterparts in the case of war. The United States should establish bilateral training exercises with Sweden and Finland in order to give these new NATO nations a greater understanding of how to operate in a NATO construct. Conversely, cooperation with allies and partners improves U.S. forces’ understanding of how to operate effectively in an Arctic environment, making it a more reliable and efficient partner for Arctic allies. This operational experience ensures that allied forces are familiar with strategic terrain that may be leveraged during a conflict with Russia.
Conclusion: How a Proactive Arctic Strategy Supports America’s Focus on the Indo-Pacific
The United States publication of the 2024 Arctic Strategy provides a transparent approach aimed at reducing the possibility of escalation in the Arctic. Moreover, the current strategy recognizes Russia’s and China’s Arctic ambitions and that the growing collaboration between Russia and the PRC have “the potential to alter the Arctic’s stability and threat picture.”36)U.S. Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Arctic Strategy. U.S. Department of Defense (2024) Arctic Strategy. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2024 The strategy presents a tangible and realistic way forward for the U.S. to enhance the Joint Force’s Arctic capabilities, engage with Allies and partners, and demonstrate an ability to work together across defense forces. Although the strategy indicates increased U.S. involvement in the Arctic, it remains reactive. The 2024 Arctic Strategy already outlines a tangible way for the United States to commit energy and resources to the region. Although a deliberate shift in messaging will not change the U.S. footprint in the Arctic, it will change the U.S. mindset towards the region. By making the Arctic a priority, the U.S. demonstrates its commitment to supporting its Allies in the event that Russia or China attacks.
Furthermore, by shifting to a proactive Arctic Strategy, the United States is not abandoning its focus on the Indo-Pacific, because the PRC envisions itself as a polar power and intends to reshape the international system in its favor. Future conflict with the PRC will not be geographically constrained to the Indo-Pacific. By shifting to a proactive Arctic Strategy now, the United States can deter China from expanding its control over the Arctic and its critical resources. The future battlefield is melting and only by taking actions today can the United States and its NATO allies win tomorrow’s war in the Arctic.
Sydney Murkins is a United States Marine and Foreign Area Officer who is currently based out of the U.S. Embassy, Oslo. She is a Norwegian speaker and holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia) from Naval Postgraduate School. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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