Israel’s Military Strategy in Gaza: Success or Failure? Lessons from the British Military

The ongoing war in Gaza is tragic in terms of human suffering and there is little sign that this conflict will come to an end any time soon. This article asks what lessons can be drawn from recent British military history in defining success or failure.

Israel’s war against Hamas and Gaza has entered into its sixth month and no end is insight. What started as the “worst failure of[…] intelligence and operational forces since the establishment of the state,” has become a potential “forever war”for Israel. The war has led to widespread condemnation of Israel globally as well as the rise of antisemitism, including here in Australia. The war has seen the killing of up to 30,000 Palestinians (civilians and armed fighters) as well as a very high number of children, with some suggesting a rate of up to 600 per week.

Israel has been accused of committing genocide against Palestinians (South Africa v Israel before the International Court of Justice), excessive targeting of noncombatants, and allowing a humanitarian catastrophe to evolve. These allegations are being refuted by Israel and military commentators, highlighting the fact that Gaza is “the most populated battlefield ever fought in the history of wars,” and that “Israel implemented more measures to prevent civilian casualties than any other nation in history.” While allegations and counter-allegations can only be assessed in a balanced and fair manner once the “fog of war” has lifted, and following the cessation of hostilities, the enormity of the human suffering as a consequence of the 7 October remains.

The successful application of military force is reliant on the correct understanding of the type of campaign being fought. For tactical, operational and strategic success, Israel must understand what they are fighting. A military analysis of the lessons learned from the British military from 50 year’s of fighting asymmetric wars can provide insight for Israel’s military, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), and its political leadership.

Successful application of military force is reliant on the correct understanding of the type of campaign being fought. For tactical, operational, and strategic success, Israel must understand what they are fighting.

Basra, Iraq gives us an example. After the end of major combat operations in spring 2003, the British Army stripped back troop numbers and took a tactical approach based around N Ireland. It saw a rapid draw-down of troops against a background of rising violence. This violence was provoked by the appointment of extremist leaders by the Coalition Provisional Authority as they handed control to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004. The British saw failure to provide credible law and order; Shi’a ties of loyalty that were stronger to tribe and religion than they were to institutions; and a failure to deliver basic civic infrastructure.

The British classified Iraq as a counterinsurgency, a claim that required a campaign of winning the consent of the people. In Iraq, consent to be governed would always have to be measured and weighed against religious and ethnic delineations. In Gaza, by contrast, it will have to be weighed against decades of hatred of the state of Israel by the people of Palestine for historical reasons. Such hatred is not going to be overcome by aid and development promises alone. The consent of the people in Gaza was a pipe dream even before the 10/7 massacre: only 24 percent of Palestinians, for instance, supported the two state solution.

The British in Basra made continued efforts to establish governance. In January 2005, Shi’a Islamists won provincial elections; however, this only exacerbated the situation by formalising extremist control of the city. Iranian-backed parties won just over 55 percent of the vote. The British congratulated themselves on an incident-free election, but the true reason for the peaceful period was that the extremist Islamists did not want to interfere in an election in which they were going to be voted into power. Violence in Basra and against the British swiftly escalated immediately after the elections, as the new government used their influence and power to create militias, who in turn created no-go areas in Basra and became the real power brokers in the city.

By attempting to reconcile with extremist Shi’a leaders to keep the peace, the British simply stored up violence for later on. Once these leaders consolidated their power bases, they began to challenge each other and the British Army for overall control of Basra.

And here is the danger faced by Israel in Gaza: if Israel negotiates too soon, it runs the risk of Hamas or a new extremist variant consolidating, rearming, perhaps getting re-elected, and the violence continues – exactly as happened in Basra.

The lack ofbasic governance in Basra in turn led to a situation where various, differently motivated groups saw an opportunity to fill a vacuum. It wasn’t an insurgency: it was a battle to establish control and power where there was none. The British Army was simply an unwanted guest in the middle of what was always a sectarian civil war.

Likewise, Gaza cannot reasonably be classified as a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. To do so fundamentally fails to understand what Hamas are, what their mission is (to destroy Israel), or what can reasonably be achieved by political means. There can be no political solution while Hamas remains a viable actor in Gaza. The only answer is Hamas’ military degradation to the point of ineffectiveness and their removal as a lever of governance. What comes next is the principle lesson: do not create a vacuum for malign actors to fill.

Sometimes, wars have to be won by victory. Peace settlements only come once the enemy is defeated or sufficiently degraded. We don’t pretend to know what that settlement looks like. But what is clear is that this war doesn’t end while Hamas retains its capability and intent to attack Israel. This war is going to continue to come at a tremendous civilian human cost, as all urban warfare does. It’s vital that the wider international community pressures Israel to let in as much humanitarian aid as possible, to avoid targeting civilians unnecessarily, and to provide Palestinians with safe havens.

And we agree with some critics that a defeat of Hamas may not be possible, and there are almost certainly going to be continued strategic ramifications for the West Bank, Lebanon, and Jerusalem. The biggest challenge of all: can the Israelis balance escalation in those other areas, while also fighting in Gaza, undertaking sufficient humanitarian relief to keep their allies onside, and all that while Netanyahu is in a thrall to right wing hard liners?

This situation is insanely complex, always has been, and there are no easy answers to this conflict. What would be the worst end state of the conflict is to “sow the seeds of hatreds for generations to come.”

Andrew Fox is a former Parachute Regiment officer with three combat tours in Afghanistan and a Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.