Iranian dissidents disrupt over 210 regime Foreign Ministry websites and servers
Iranian dissidents have been able to take control over 210 websites, of the regime’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sunday. The front pages of 210 websites were replaced with images of the Iranian Resistance leadership calling for the regime’s overthrow.
The regime’s embassies are acting as outposts of the mullahs and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). These embassies provide diplomatic cover for the regime’s diplomat terrorists, such as Assadollah Assadi, who took explosives from Tehran to Vienna.
The IRGC paramilitary Basij membership card of current Iranian regime Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, issued on November 27, 2021, describes him as an “active Basij member”.He is an IRGC and its Quds Force career member in the regime’s Foreign Ministry.
Iranian regime describes Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, as an “active Basij member” who carrying a membership card issued on November 27, 2021.
The front pages of these 210 websites and software apps associated with the mullahs’ Foreign Ministry and their embassies across the globe were defaced and replaced with images of the Iranian Resistance leadership and slogans calling for the regime’s overthrow.
The MFA’s servers and main data banks in Tehran have been “destroyed”, according to reports. Tens of thousands of documents have been obtained and confiscated by the Ghiam ta Sarnegouni (uprising until regime overthrow) group.
Main software applications and the MFA’s internal coordination programs, including apps managing news and reports, visas, appointments and referrals, personnel, salaries, and other branches have been complicated and dissidents were able to take control of these branches.
The regime’s embassies are acting as outposts of the mullahs’ Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)3 and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). These embassies provide diplomatic cover for the regime’s diplomat terrorists, such as Assadollah Assadi, who transferred explosives from Tehran to Vienna and personally delivered the package to an Iranian regime team in a plot aiming to bomb a massive rally of the Iranian opposition coalition NCRI back in 2018. Assadi and his three accomplices were arrested, found guilty, and currently behind bars in Belgium.
In an audio file leaked back in 2020, Former Iranian regime foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was heard saying: “Our MFA has been involved in security affairs since day one. The orders and instructions issued to for the MFA, ever since 1979, have been focused on political-security matters.
in the 1990s the MFA Economy Department was shut down and instead they launched regional departments more focused on political/security matters.”
The IRGC paramilitary Basij membership card of current Iranian regime Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, issued on November 27, 2021, describes him as an “active Basij member”.
Abdullahian is a career member of the IRGC and its Quds Force in the regime’s Foreign Ministry. He is one of the mullahs’ active links to the Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. “The average meetings we have is, I believe, between three and a half to six hours long,” Amir Abdullahian once said.
The leaked documents also include at least 158 pages of MFA personnel and their organizational status, and especially those in MFA representative office in foreign countries. Details of at least 10,878 personnel have also been published.
There are also the names of 6,432 MFA personnel along with their special personnel identifiers. Even the names of Central Council members and advisors, along with the names and phone/fax numbers of MFA Basij base commanders, and their current position in the MFA.
An official MFA document reads: “Efforts to discredit the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK)1, and denying them of the assets and values that they pursue. Those associated with the MEK are extremely motivated to launch resistance measures. They have high intelligence capabilities and are in general a very dangerous group. They are the only organization that has an agenda for being an alternative. As a result, the MEK is both a dissident group seeking to [overthrow the regime] and an alternative.”
The leaked documents also indicate that the regime’s Supreme National Security Council has established a “supreme committee” in the Intelligence Ministry in charge of measures to confront the MEK.
Other committees have also been established with the goal of using the capacity of all entities. However, the MOIS is the main entity in charge of anti-MEK measures.
Another official document refers to the MEK’s active role in the recent Iranian uprising and the MEK’s condemnation of the IRGC’s missile attack against Iranian Kurdish groups stationed in northern Iraq.
These official documents also refer to a tweet by Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the Iranian opposition coalition the National Council of Resistance of Iran - NCRI2, regarding “fake numbers of those killed and arrested [in the uprising that began in September 2022], and expanding the [uprising].”
The documents also refer to the MEK’s initiatives and calls on the Iranian people to take part in the uprising, inviting truck drivers to join the country’s nationwide strikes, efforts to continue street protests across the country, the MEK’s continued efforts to maintain ongoing street protests, calls by the MEK for rallies, gatherings, and protests by using their platforms inside the country.
The leaked documents also refer to measures at the regime’s national security apparatus to confront the MEK, including an MFA “political committee” with representatives from all entities focused on measures against the MEK. These measures include:
• Preparing newsletters on MEK activities aimed at informing foreign governments and their diplomats
• Warning European countries with protest letters regarding the MEK’s new approach and strategy, and establishing a network of Resistance Units inside Iran.
• Weighing measures and discussing the necessary actions needed to have the European Union designate the MEK as a terrorist organization. This has also been pursued with like-minded countries, such as Russia, Syria, Iraq, Italy, and Cuba.
• Monitoring contacts and meetings between current and former U.S. officials and members of Congress with the MEK
• Sending protest letters to the U.S. (through Switzerland) and targeted European countries regarding support for the MEK in their countries
• Summoning various ambassadors, including the Slovenian Ambassador in Tehran and voicing strong criticism of measures by the country’s “extreme Prime Minister and his wife” for their physical and online presence and participation in MEK events, and their vivid support of the MEK.
• Weighing various legal, judicial, and documentary measures and solutions, and taking the necessary measures to confront the “MEK’s conspiracies, plots, terrorist, and destructive measures.”
MFA document indicating the entities and individuals participating in the Political Committee to confront the MEK:
• Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Anti-Terrorism Department, Secretary of the Anti-MEK Committee)
• IRGC Intelligence Organization (Legal Department chief)
• IRGC Quds Force (IRGC Quds Force Intelligence Department)
• Director General of Interpol (inside Iran)
• Interior Ministry (Deputy of Security and Police Affairs)
• Head of the Prosecutor’s Office (Deputy of International Affairs)
• Head of the State Security Forces’ Intelligence and Security Department
• Secretary of the Human Rights Department and Deputy of International Affairs – Judiciary
MFA document indicating which of its entities and participate in the Political Committee to confront the MEK:
• Department of Western Europe
• Department of East Mediterranean
• Department of International Peace and Security
• Department of International Legal Affairs
• Department of the Persian Gulf
• Center of Spokespersons and Media Diplomacy
• Department of the United States
• Bureau of Reports Evaluation
• Department of Planning and Strategic Monitoring
Shahin Gobadi
NCRI
+33 6 61 65 32 31
email us here
1 https://english.mojahedin.org/a-primer-on-the-history-of-the-peoples-mojahedin-organization-of-iran/
2 https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/about-ncri/ncri/alternative/
3 https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/inside-irans-army-of-terror-and-oppression-revolutionary-guards-irgc-part-2/